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A New Garden of Eden?
Stimuli to Enforcement and Compliance in
Environmental Law
ANDREW WAITE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The thesis of this article is that the enforcement of and com-
pliance with environmental law is the result of many different
stimuli affecting both the enforcers and those who must comply
with the law.
I have argued elsewhere' that environmental law can be com-
pared to the rings of a sliced onion. Starting at the centre and
moving outwards, the rings represent:
A - environmental imperatives, arising from the laws of na-
ture which must be obeyed if adverse environmental impacts are
to be avoided;
B - environmental principles arising from the environmental
imperatives, such as the polluter pays principle;
C - the substantive rules of law;
D - the rules on access to justice and the duties and powers of
the enforcement authorities;
E - the actual behaviour of the environmental "actors", in-
cluding legislators, judges, enforcement authorities, economic pro-
ducers and those in their supply chain as well as those citizens
who are affected by the environmental depredations of others or
who have the interest and commitment to participate in the en-
forcement process.
The optimum state of environmental law is the achievement
of equilibrium represented by the equation:
A=BxCxDxE.
* Partner, Planning and Environment Department, Co-ordinator of the Envi-
ronment Group Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Solicitors; Vice President and former
President of the European Environmental Law Association; former Vice Chair for
Western Europe of IUCN's Commission on Environmental Law. Email address:
andrew.waite@blplaw.com.
1. Andrew Waite, The Quest for Environmental Law Equilibrium, 7 ENVTL. L.
REv. 34, 36 (2005).
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If one of the multipliers B to E is too high or too low, it must
be balanced by a corresponding decrease or increase in one or
more of the other multipliers. Otherwise the impact of environ-
mental law is either excessive or deficient. 2 This approach under-
lies the discussion that follows.
II. INTERACTION OF THE ONION RINGS
The 'onion rings' interact in complex ways which critically af-
fect the way in which the law operates in practice including com-
pliance by industrial operators and individuals and the extent of
enforcement by the enforcement authorities.
Starting at the core of the onion, the environmental impera-
tives (A) affect all the other layers, influencing the development of
environmental principles (B), the substantive environmental law
(C), enforcement duties and powers and access to justice (D), as
well as the behaviour of the environmental actors (E). It is obvi-
ous that the nature and scope of the environmental imperatives,
as well as the quality of the underlying science, is critical to the
development of the whole apparatus of environmental law (layers
B-E).3
The environmental imperatives are becoming increasingly
well known through education and the media, a tendency rein-
forced by an appreciation of the existence of the growing corpus of
substantive environmental law. The unique feature of environ-
mental law is that it is based on our understanding of the work-
ings of the law of nature at any point in time. 4 In recent years we
have achieved a more holistic appreciation of the environment. 5
This has resulted in international agreements designed to protect
the global rather than solely the local environment on the one
hand6 and a focus on integrated pollution controls on the other,
based on the premise that it is pointless to reduce emissions into
one environmental medium if that leads to an unacceptable in-
2. Id. at 37-39.
3. Id. at 56-57.
4. Nicholas A. Robinson, Paper Delivered at the Global Judges' Symposium on
Sustainable Development and the Role of Law: Environmental Law: The Bedrock for
Sustainability, (Aug. 20, 2002).
5. Waite, supra note 1, at 35-36.
6. See, e.g., The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
1992, GE.05-6220 (E) 200705; The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, 1997.
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crease in emissions to another.7 The growing sophistication of en-
vironmental law based on an improved and increasing
understanding of the environmental imperatives is likely to pro-
duce in many people a feeling of moral obligation to comply with
the law or in some cases to encourage its enforcement. This may
be regarded as the educative function of environmental law. That
process may be assisted by the environmental principles, which
although sometimes misunderstood and often confused with the
substantive rules of environmental law, provide some rallying
calls which give an impetus to compliance.
Environmental principles (B) directly affect the development
of substantive environmental law8 and the rules on enforcement
and access to justice (D), as well as the behaviour of the environ-
mental actors (E). Many people who are ignorant of the precise
rules of environmental law are guided by the polluter pays princi-
ple, the precautionary principle and the sustainable development
principle, even in the form of banner headlines, rather than prin-
ciples with detailed content.9
The substantive environmental law in turn affects the proce-
dural enforcement rules (D) 10 as well as the way they are used,
enforced and litigated in practice (E). Finally, the procedural
rules themselves, which include rights of access to environmental
7. See generally ROYAL COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION, FIFTH RE-
PORT, AIR POLLUTION CONTROL: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH, 1976, Cm. 6371; ROYAL
COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION, TWELFTH REPORT, BEST PRACTICABLE EN-
VIRONMENTAL OPTION, 1988, Cm. 310; Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, pt. 1
(U.K.); Michael Purdue, Integrated Pollution Control in the Environmental Protection
Act 1990: A Coming of Age of Environmental Law?, (1991) 54 Mod. L. Rev. 534; An-
drew Waite, The Legal Aspects of Integrated Pollution Control, 4 LAND MGMT. &
ENvTL. L. REP. 2 (1992); Council Directive 96/61, Concerning Integrated Pollution
Prevention and Control, 1996 O.J. (L 257) 26 (EC); Pollution Prevention and Control
(England and Wales) Regulations, 2000, (as amended), S.I. 2000/1973.
8. Waite, supra note 1, at 35-36.
9. See generally DAVID HUGHES, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 17-32 (4th ed.
2002); MICHEL PRIEUR, DROIT DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT, Titre 2, (5e ed. 2004); NICOLAS
DE SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES: FROM POLITICAL SLOGANS TO LEGAL RULES
(Susan Leubusher trans., 2002).
10. For example, if a high pollution threshold constitutes the trigger for action
under an environmental regulatory regime, a duty to enforce may appropriately be
placed on the authorities. On the other hand, if any amount of pollution suffices to
trigger action, it is better to allow the authorities discretion as to when to act. The
contaminated land and statutory nuisance regimes provide high thresholds coupled
with a duty to enforce, whereas the works notice procedure for water pollution is ac-
tionable at the discretion of the authorities in the event of any pollution. Compare
Environmental Protection Act,1990, c. 43, §§ 78A(2), 79(1) (Eng.) (as amended) with
the Water Resources Act, 1991, c. 57, § 161A (U.K.).
2007] 345
3
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
information and access to justice, are bound to affect the beha-
viour of those who operate within the framework of environmental
law.
At the outer layer (E), there is also a degree of "rippling in" as
the behaviour of the environmental actors and the administrative
and judicial infrastructure which underpins it can be shown to af-
fect the inner layers of substantive environmental law (C) and the
procedural enforcement rules (D). In particular, an effective ad-
ministrative and judicial system should enable the substantive
and procedural rules to operate in practice, so that weaknesses
can be observed and corrected. In particular, defects are exposed
and the law refined in the crucible of litigation as judges seek to
interpret and develop the law to achieve justice and satisfy the
environmental imperatives.
The interaction of the onion layers is shown in the following
diagram (Figure 1).
4 A = ENVIRONMENTAL IMPERATIVESSB = ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES
C = SUBSTANTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
D = ENFORCEMENT DUTIES AND AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
E = BEHAVIOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL ACTORS
FIGURE 1
III. THE IMPACT OF SUBSTANTIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
The content of the substantive environmental law itself may
also affect the behaviour of the environmental actors, including
compliance and enforcement. If the law is vague or there are too
many difficult hurdles to surmount to be sure of success before the
courts, the authorities may be unwilling to enforce it.
A. The Van de Walle Case
In some rare cases compliance and enforcement may lapse be-
cause the law is perceived to be too stringent. A notableexample
is the decision of the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") in Van de
346 [Vol. 24
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Walle, 11 in which the court decided that petrol, which had leaked
from a petrol filling station, and the soil which it had contami-
nated should both be treated as waste. 12
That decision has been widely (although, in the author's view,
wrongly) interpreted to mean that all contaminated soil is waste
and that remedial action must therefore be taken to dispose of or
recover it.13 The impact of that interpretation on the older indus-
11. Case C-1/03, Van de Walle v. Texaco Belgium SA 2004 E.C.R. 1-7613.
12. The Van de Walle case concerned a leakage of hydrocarbons from defective
petrol storage facilities at a Texaco service station in Brussels. Id. The hydrocarbons
migrated to the cellar of the building on the adjoining property, which required
remediation. Id. The service station was owned by Texaco but operated by a manager
who had full responsibility for maintaining the property in perfect condition. Id. The
manager operated the service station on his own behalf. Id. In the course of criminal
proceedings against Texaco and its chief officers, the question of whether the contami-
nated soil was waste was referred to the ECJ. Id. The ECJ held that the contami-
nated soil was waste within the meaning of the Waste Framework Directive ("WFD").
Id. 91 62. The reasoning of the ECJ was essentially as follows: (1) the accidentally
spilled hydrocarbons are not a product which can be re-used without processing, and
are therefore residues which are discarded, albeit involuntarily; (2) under Articles 4
and 8 of the WFD, Member States have a duty to ensure that waste is recovered or
disposed of by its holder; (3) it follows that the contaminated soil (which cannot be
separated from the hydrocarbons) is required to be discarded and therefore disposed
of and recovered in order that the obligation not to abandon and to recover or dispose
of the waste hydrocarbons is complied with; (4) it follows further that the fact that soil
is not excavated has no bearing on its classification as waste. Id.
13. The Van de Walle decision should not apply in the following cases:
a. Pre-1977 spillages - the European Council Directive on Waste Management
("WED"), is not retroactive, and so should not apply to waste discarded before the
implementation date in 1977, Council Directive 2006/21/EC, art. 24, 2006 O.J. (L 102)
15-34 (EC).
b. No remediation is required - until remediation is required under the contaminated
land legislation, Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, §§ 78A-78YC (Gr. Brit), or
as a condition of planning permission if the site is to be developed, there should be no
obligation to discard and then dispose of or recover it under the WFD. No time limits
are placed on the duty of member states to ensure that waste holders have their waste
recovered or disposed of. Council Directive 2006/21JEC, 2006 O.J. (L 102) 15-34 (EC).
Additionally, the WFD's aim of achieving a high level of environmental protection
would be negated if people are required to discard material unnecessarily. In Van de
Walle, remediation was required and had already been carried out before the ECJ
hearing. Van de Walle, 2004 E.C.R. 1-7613 91 14.
c. Recovery by degradation or dispersal - in some cases, spilled substances that are
waste may be recovered most effectively by leaving them in the ground and allowing
them to degrade or disperse naturally and form part of the ground. This solution
would not involve the need to discard (and then dispose of or recover) the contami-
nated soil.
d. Made ground - if waste has been deposited on land to create made ground, that
material has been recovered by the act of depositing it and is no longer waste provided
that it is suitable for the purpose.
e. Recovery by becoming part of the ground - waste deposited in the ground by way of
disposal may have been recovered subsequently, for example, by becoming part of the
5
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trialised countries such as the United Kingdom would be
unimaginable!
The result has been what can only be described as a massive
conspiracy to ignore the Van de Walle decision. In the UK despite
a ministerial statement to the effect that Van de Walle represents
the law and that its implications are being considered, the govern-
ment and the regulatory authorities have for the moment chosen
to ignore it in practice. In the meantime, the proposed new Waste
Framework Directive to exclude contaminated soil from the scope
of the Directive provided that it is covered by other European
Community legislation. 14
B. The Contaminated Land Regime and the Circular
Facilities Case
The contaminated land legislation came into force in England
in April 2000.15 This legislation imposes duties on the enforcing
authorities to investigate their areas for any land that meets the
statutory criteria for contaminated land, to designate any such
land as contaminated land, 16 and, finally, to ensure that the re-
sponsible party (the "appropriate person") carries out the appro-
priate remediation. 17 However, due to the complexity of the
legislation, far fewer sites have been designated and remediated
than had been expected.
The Circular Facilities case 18 illustrates the difficulties that
can arise in ascertaining which party is responsible for carrying
out remediation.
The "appropriate persons" primarily liable are those who
"caused" or "knowingly permitted" the contaminating substances
ground, whether as surface or sub-surface material, irrespective of the date of the
deposit. An obvious example is a prehistoric waste tip which, when discovered, is
considered not as waste but as part of the cultural environment.
14. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Waste, at 2, COM (2005) 667 final (Dec. 21, 2005).
15. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, §§ 78A-78YC (Gr. Brit.), intro-
duced by the Environment Act, 1995, c. 25, § 57 (Gr. Brit.). See also Contaminated
Land (England) Regulations, 2000, S.I. 2000/227. The legislation is also supported by
statutory guidance. DEP'T FOR ENV'T FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION ACT 1990: PART 2A CONTAMINATED LAND, DEFRA CIRCULAR 01/2006, An-
nex 3.
16. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 78B (Gr. Brit.).
17. Id.
18. Circular Facilities (London) Ltd. v. Sevenoaks District Council, [2005] EWHC
(Admin) 865, [35] (Eng.).
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to be present (Class A persons). 19 If no Class A persons can be
found, liability passes to "innocent" owners and occupiers (Class B
persons).20 Detailed statutory guidance issued under the legisla-
tion provides for parties within a Class to agree on the allocation
of liability between them.21 Failing agreement, some parties may
be excluded from liability under a series of exclusion tests. 22 After
that, if more than one party remains in the Class, liability has to
be apportioned in accordance with the statutory guidance.23
Particular difficulties arise in interpreting the term "know-
ingly permitted,"24 and in particular when an "innocent pur-
chaser" who subsequently discovers contamination on the site
may become a "knowing permitter."25
The Circular Facilities case concerned a housing development
built in 1980 over infilled clay pits.26 Circular Facilities (London)
Ltd. ("CF") acquired the site from a Mr. Scott in 1979, but Mr.
Scott retained responsibility for the development. 27 At that time a
soil investigation report, which identified gases bubbling through
organic material in the former clay pits, was handed to the local
authority, put on the planning register, and made available for
inspection by members of the public. 28
In 2002, the Sevenoaks District Council decided that this
problem created a significant risk of explosion and asphyxiation,
and consequently that the site was "contaminated land" for the
purposes of Part IIA.29 It notified CF that it was a Class A appro-
priate person because it had knowingly permitted the presence of
the contamination on the land. 30
Eventually the Council served a remediation notice on CF
who appealed to the Magistrates Court3 l on the ground that the
19. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 78F(2), (3) (Gr. Brit.).
20. Id. § 78F(4), (5) (Gr. Brit.).
21. DEP'T FOR ENV'T FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, supra note 15, Annex 3, TT D.38, 39.
22. Id. at T D.40-72 (for Class A exclusions), [ D.87-90 (for Class B exclusions).
23. Id. at TT D.75-86 (Class A), T D.91-97 (Class B).
24. STEPHEN TROMANS & ROBERT TURRALL-CLARKE, CONTAMINATED LAND: THE
NEW REGIME, PART 11A OF THE ENVIRONMETNAL PROTECTION ACT 1990, 13.18 (2000).
25. Daniel Lawrence and Robert Lee, Permitting Uncertainty: Owners, Occupiers
and Responsibility for Remediation, 66 MOD. L. REV. 261 (2003).
26. Circular Facilities, [2005] EWHC at 8.
27. Id. T 13, 24, 27-28.
28. Id. 9.
29. See id. T1 2.
30. Id.
31. Since August 4, 2006 appeals against remediation notices are dealt with by
DEFRA rather than magistrates courts, so expertise is likely to be more concentrated
than under the previous procedure.
2007] 349
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company was not an "appropriate person." CF's appeal challenged
the district judge's decision that CF was an "appropriate person"
because it had knowingly permitted the presence of the organic
material on the site. 32
The High Court granted CF's appeal and ordered a retrial.
Justice Newman considered that there was probably sufficient ev-
idence pointing to Mr. Scott being the agent of CF so that his
knowledge could be imputed to CF.33 However, Justice Newman
found that the district judge's reasoning was unclear as to what
basis he had considered CF to have the necessary knowledge. 34
That was a fatal flaw.
The district judge found that the Managing Director (MD) of
CF was the company's "controlling mind" and that he had either
entered into an informal partnership with Mr. Scott or used him
as agent of CF.35 Because the MD had stated in evidence that he
was unaware of the contamination at the relevant time, it is un-
clear whether the District Judge considered that Mr. Scott's
knowledge was to be imputed to CF's MD and therefore to CF or
whether he found that the MD did have personal knowledge but
was mistaken in his recollection. 36
The parties subsequently settled the case on undisclosed
terms.37 Apparently, the cost of litigation was becoming too high
32. Circular Facilities, [2005] EWHC at T 29.
33. Id. 35.
34. Id. 34-35.
35. Id. 27.
36. Id. 35. Two points of general application were also dealt with in the judg-
ment. First, the fact that the soil investigation report was on the planning register
and therefore available to CF was insufficient to impute knowledge of the contents of
the report to CF. Id. 38. This represents a narrowing of the concept of "knowingly
permitting" which case law indicates includes constructive knowledge (what a person
ought to know) as well as actual knowledge. However, this does not mean that the
courts are excluding constructive knowledge entirely in this context. It is probable
that the High Court judge merely considered that in 1980 (when contaminated land
was not such an important issue as it is today) an owner/developer would not be ex-
pected to check the planning register for information on contamination. It is possible
that the courts would reach a different conclusion in respect of a developer in 2006
who might be expected to be much more attuned to contamination issues and the
importance of undertaking environmental due diligence. Secondly, the High Court
also confirmed that "knowingly permitting" does not require knowledge of the poten-
tial harm to which the presence of the substance in the soil could give rise. Id. T 41-
43. A person only needs to have knowledge of the presence of the substance. Id.
37. Ashfords, National Grid Gas, RECENT CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTAMI-
NATED LAND, June 2006, available at http://www.ashfords.co.uk/publications_
template.asp?Pubid=369.
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for the council to pursue further.38 It appears that the difficulties
of establishing who the "appropriate persons" are in historic con-
tamination cases have also slowed the implementation of the con-
taminated land legislation by local authorities generally. 39
The Circular Facilities case illustrates the importance for lo-
cal authorities of working carefully through the evidence to estab-
lish which parties are knowing permitters. This may require
using knowledge of the rules of agency to decide whether the
knowledge of a particular individual can be attributed to a com-
pany. Even in the Circular Facilities case, the High Court judge
considered that there was probably enough evidence to conclude
that CF was a knowing permitter.40 The problem arose because
the District Judge had not shown clearly his reasons for coming to
that conclusion.
Although not all cases are as complex as Circular Facilities, it
does illustrate the dangers of incorporating complex legal concepts
in regulatory legislation, which has to be interpreted and applied
in the first instance by officials and adjudicated in the event of
dispute by courts with little experience of such matters. Nonethe-
less, it has been said that:
[dlespite the many problems and complexities, it is undeniable
that Part IIA has kick-started the clean-up of many of the na-
tion's most polluted sites. Many would also argue that a true
measure of its success would be to look at the number of sites
cleaned up as an indirect result of the regime, not just those
remediated through regulatory intervention. 41
IN. TOOLS OF ENFORCEMENT 42
No system of environmental control can operate effectively if
the regulatory authorities lack adequate enforcement tools. Some
38. Id.
39. Tensions Mount as Land Remediation Regime Stalls, ENDS REP., April 2006,
at 35.
40. Circular Facilities, [2005] EWHC (Admin) 865, 35.
41. Tensions Mount as Land Remediation Regime Stalls, supra note 39, at 38.
Many sites are remediated in the context of development permitted under planning
legislation. In other cases, remediation may be carried out in order to mitigate the
risk of liability under the contaminated land legislation.
42. For an earlier review, see Andrew J. Waite, Criminal and Administrative
Sanctions in English Environmental Law 1 LAND MGMT. AND ENVTL. L. REP. 38
(1989).
3512007]
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of the main tools available to the authorities in England and
Wales are explored below.
A. Criminal Offences
In England and Wales, most environmental legislation relies
primarily on criminal sanctions as an enforcement tool. For ex-
ample, it is an offence to "cause[ I or knowingly permit[ I any poi-
sonous, noxious or polluting matter or any solid waste matter to
enter any controlled waters."43 Other statutes provide for offences
relating to the disposal or recovery of waste except in accordance
with a waste management licence. 44 A number of offences exist
for harming wildlife45 and damaging a site of special scientific in-
terest without reasonable excuse. 46 It is an offence to operate an
"installation" without a permit 47 and to be the occupier of any
building or industrial or trade premises if such premises contain a
chimney from which emits dark smoke.48
Whilst environmental offences are generally strict liability
crimes, they are sometimes subject to defences, which may miti-
gate or overcome that liability. The waste offences referred to are
subject to a due diligence defence.49 The same applies to the of-
fence of releasing or allowing to escape into the wild any non-na-
tive species. 50 The duty of care requirements in relation to the
management of waste are qualified in that "the duty of any person
who imports, produces, carries, keeps, treats or disposes of con-
trolled waste or, as a broker, has control of such waste" is limited
to taking "all such measures applicable to him in that capacity as
are reasonable in the circumstances" to (inter alia) prevent contra-
ventions of waste legislation by other persons, to prevent the
waste escaping from his or any other person's control, and to se-
cure that the waste is transferred with an adequate written
43. Water Resources Act, 1991, c. 57, § 85(1) (U.K.).
44. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 33 (Eng.).
45. Wildlife and Countryside Act, 1981, c. 69, §§ 1, 5, 9, 13 (Gr. Brit.).
46. Wildlife and Countryside Act, 1981, c. 69, § 28P (Eng.).
47. Pollution Prevention and Control (England and Wales) Regulations, 2000, S.I.
2000/1973, reg. 9 (Eng.).
48. Clean Air Act, 1993, c. 11, §§ 1, 2 (Gr. Brit.).
49. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 33(7)(a) (Gr. Brit.). The Govern-
ment proposes to remove this defence. See DEP'T FOR ENV'T FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS,
ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITTING PROGRAMME: SECOND CONSULTATION ON PROPOSALS FOR
CREATING A STREAMLINED ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITTING AND COMPLIANCE SYSTEM,
2.85-2.88 (2006).
50. Wildlife and Countryside Act, 1981, c. 69, § 14(3) (Gr. Brit.).
[Vol. 24352
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description. 51 Most environmental offences provide for a defence
if the defendant has a permit or licence from the competent au-
thority that permits the act in question.52 Despite the predomi-
nance of strict liability in this area, some offences do incorporate
the traditional mens rea requirement, such as in the Wildlife and
Countryside Act which references intentionally or recklessly kill-
ing, injuring or taking any wild bird.53
Two questions arise with regard to criminal offences in rela-
tion to regulatory matters. Are criminal sanctions an effective
tool? If so, should they be offences of strict liability? As to the
first question, Professor Richard Macrory's official study54 indi-
cates concerns that although criminal prosecutions are a neces-
sary tool in enforcing regulatory compliance, when used or
available in isolation, they have a number of significant disadvan-
tages.55 First, criminal prosecutions may be a disproportionate
response where there is regulatory failure. 56 Second, the prosecu-
tions are resource-intensive for regulatory authorities to prepare,
and consequently the authorities may be deterred from initiating
proceedings, resulting in a so-called compliance deficit.5 7 Third,
fines imposed on the liable party(ies) upon a successful prosecu-
tion are not frequently sufficient deterrents, probably because reg-
ulatory offences are not considered truly criminal.58 Fourth,
criminal sanctions have lost their stigma, which may be associ-
ated with the strict liability nature of most of these offences.5 9
Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence demonstrates that many respon-
sible companies try hard to avoid criminal convictions for environ-
mental offences and the potential subsequent national and local
publicity of such conviction.60 That is particularly true of compa-
nies for whom a good environmental record is seen as a business
51. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 34(1) (Gr. Brit.) (emphasis
added).
52. E.g., Water Resources Act, 1991, c. 57, § 88 (U.K.). Note that in the case of
section 33 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (waste management offences),
the absence of a waste management licence is part of the offence and must be proved
by the prosecution. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 33 (Gr. Brit.).
53. Section 1 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act, 1981, c. 69, § 1 (U.K.) (emphasis
added).
54. RICHARD MACRORY, REGULATORY JUSTICE: SANCTIONING IN A POsT-HAMPTON
WORLD 12-16 (2006).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 15.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 14.
59. Id. at 15.
60. The author has heard this from many company representatives.
2007] 353
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goal. Fifth, criminal prosecutions may not address the needs of
victims (and, in the present context, environmental degradation)
adequately. 61
On the issue of strict liability, it can be suggested that al-
though convictions may be easier to secure in the case of strict
liability offences, they do not carry the same level of social oppro-
brium as those that have the requirement of mens rea. However,
since prosecutions are generally brought in cases where there is
demonstrable fault on the part of the defendant, the additional
burden on prosecutors to prove mens rea would probably not be too
great.62
To summarise so far, criminal prosecutions remain a neces-
sary part of the enforcement tool-kit. However, they should be re-
served for the most serious matters, the offences should be subject
to a mens rea requirement, and the heavy instrument of the crimi-
nal law should be supported by a number of other tools to provide
a flexible and proportionate enforcement regime.
B. Administrative Penalties
Although some environmental law regimes are underpinned
only by the criminal law, 63 it is more common to find, at least in
recent years, that they are supported by other enforcement mech-
anisms. A relative newcomer in the environmental field is the
fixed penalty notice, which generally applies to "low-level" envi-
ronmental crimes. The enforcing authority has the power to serve
such a notice on a person (who appears to it to have committed an
offence), giving that person an opportunity to pay a fixed-and
generally small-penalty as an alternative to facing criminal
prosecution. Examples are a fixed penalty of £300 for failure to
furnish to the Environment Agency copies of written waste de-
61. Id.
62. Waite, supra note 1, at 58-59. The approach advocated here has been followed
by the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law, COM (2007) 51 final (Feb. 9,
2007), which would involve criminalising nine forms of environmentally adverse con-
duct "when committed intentionally or with at least serious negligence." Id. art. 3.
Recital 3 states that "compliance can and should be strengthened by the application of
criminal sanctions, which demonstrate a social disapproval of a qualitatively different
nature compared to administrative sanctions or a compensation mechanism under
civil law." Id. recital 3.
63. E.g., Wildlife and Countryside Act, 1981, c. 69, §§ 1-27 (U.K) (wildlife protec-
tion); Clean Air Act, 1993, c. 11, §§ 1-3 (Gr. Brit.) (prohibition of dark smoke from
chimneys and from industrial or trade premises).
[Vol. 24354
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scriptions and transfer notes when required to do so by notice,64
and a fixed penalty of £75 for littering.65
Administrative penalties can offer an alternative to criminal
penalties that is more proportionate to the particular non-compli-
ance, whilst being less resource intensive for regulators. How-
ever, this result can only be achieved if penalties are variable,
allowing regulators to impose a penalty that reflects the gravity of
the offence and the attitude of the offender, as well as providing a
sufficient deterrent effect. If the recipient of a notice does not
agree to accept the penalty, then an appeals process to a special
tribunal should be allowable. In the alternative, the recipient
could elect for a trial in the criminal courts, or even an appeal to
the courts. 66 A regime that allows for the recovery of a proportion-
ate penalty under a variable penalty scheme, whilst reserving
criminal prosecution for the most serious cases, is likely to prove
far more effective than one that relies solely on criminal sanctions.
C. Statutory Notices
Statutory notices have two very different functions in envi-
ronmental law regimes. The first is to enable the regulatory au-
thority which has identified infractions or potential infractions of
the criminal law to require the regulated party to take corrective
action. This is generally an alternative to criminal prosecution
and is designed to encourage a change in behaviour such that
there will be no infringements in the future.67 Failure to comply
with a notice is a criminal offence. 68 The second function is quite
separate from criminal environmental law although sometimes
the two operate in parallel. This is to pursue an administrative
process requiring the recipient of the notice to undertake work to
64. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, §§ 34-34A (Eng.); Environmental
Protection (Duty of Care) Regulations, 1991, S.I. 1991/2839, § 4 (Gr. Brit.).
65. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 88 (Eng.). See also Noise Act,
1996, c. 37, § 8 (U.K.) (providing an option for a person accused of playing excessively
loud music during the hours of darkness to pay a fixed penalty, without necessarily
admitting guilt).
66. MICHAEL WOODS & RICHARD MACRORY, ENVIRONMENTAL CIVIL PENALTIES: A
MORE PROPORTIONATE RESPONSE TO REGULATORY BREACH (2003); MACRORY, supra
note 54, at 44-61.
67. E.g., Water Resources Act, 1991, c. 57, § 90B(1) (U.K.); Pollution Prevention
and Control (England and Wales) Regulations, 2000, S.I. 2000/1973, reg. 24.
68. E.g., Water Resources Act, 1991, c. 57, § 90B(3) (U.K.); Pollution Prevention
and Control (England and Wales) Regulations, 2000, S.I. 2000/1973, reg. 32(1)(d).
2007] 355
13
356 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24
protect or restore the environment. 69 It is not a precondition of
this type of notice that the regulatory authority identify a breach
of the criminal law, but rather actual or potential environmental
degradation which needs to be remedied. Usually, the notice is
addressed to the person who caused or knowingly permitted the
state of affairs to exist,70 although in certain circumstances, for
examplewhere no such person is found, the notice may be served
on another person, usually the owner or occupier of the premises
on which the unacceptable state of affairs exists. 71 Again, failure
to comply with the notice is an offence72 and the authorities have
powers to carry out the necessary work in default and charge the
cost to the responsible party. 73
D. Injunctions
An injunction from the court is a powerful tool to enforce the
criminal law where a criminal conviction is an inadequate deter-
rent. In some cases, environmental legislation provides specific
powers for the regulatory authority to seek an injunction. 74 This
generally applies in cases where the authority considers that
criminal prosecution would afford an inadequate remedy for the
purpose of securing compliance with the law.
69. E.g., Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, §§ 78A-78YC, 79-85 (Gr. Brit.)
(contaminated land and statutory nuisances respectively); Water Resources Act,
1991, c. 57, §§ 161A-D (U.K.).
70. E.g., Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, §§ 78F, 80(2) (Gr. Brit.) (con-
taminated land and statutory nuisance respectively). The notice under section 80(2)
must be served on the "person responsible," as defined in Environmental Protection
Act, 1990, c. 43, § 79(7). See also, e.g., Water Resources Act, 1991, c. 57, § 161A (U.K.)
(water pollution).
71. This applies in relation to contaminated land, statutory nuisance and water
pollution legislation. E.g., Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 80(2)(c) (Gr.
Brit.).
72. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, §§ 78M, 80(4) (Gr. Brit.) (contami-
nated land and statutory nuisance respectively); Water Resources Act, 1991, c. 57,
§ 161D (U.K.).
73. Environmental Protection Act, 1991, c. 43, §§ 78N-78P, 81 (Gr. Brit.); Water
Resources Act, 1991, c. 57, § 161D (U.K.).
74. E.g., Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 24, (authorizing enforcing
authority to initiate proceeding to secure compliance against a person who has failed
to comply with the requirements of an enforcement or prohibition notice), repealed by
Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 1999, c. 24, §§ 6(2) (Gr. Brit.), sched. 3 (U.K.);
Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 81(5) (authorizing proceeding to secure
abatement, prohibition or restriction for failure to comply with an abatement notice
under the statutory nuisance regime); Pollution Prevention and Control (England and
Wales) Regulations 2000, S.I. 2000/1973, reg. 33 (authorizing proceeding to secure
compliance for failure to comply with the requirements of an enforcement notice or
suspension notice).
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In the absence of such specific legislation, local authority reg-
ulators can use their powers under section 222 of the Local Gov-
ernment Act 197275 to bring proceedings for an injunction, where
they consider it expedient for the promotion of the interests of the
inhabitants of their area.76 The courts have held that an injunc-
tion should only be granted under this procedure if it appears that
criminal proceedings would be insufficient to ensure compliance. 77
The Environment Agency has standing to institute proceed-
ings for an injunction to enforce the criminal law under the gen-
eral power that it "may do anything which, in its opinion, is
calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the carry-
ing out of its functions."s78 Natural England has a power in similar
terms.79
Otherwise, in the absence of statutory authority, any person
who wishes to initiate proceedings for an injunction must seek the
consent of the Attorney-General to bring a relator action.80 This
type of action overcomes the difficulty that the person bringing
the action otherwise has no standing. The Attorney-General is
nominally the claimant and may exercise control over the case if
he wishes.8 1 However, usually he allows the relator to retain
control.8 2
E. Restoration Obligations
Modern environmental legislation often prescribes a mecha-
nism for ensuring that a person responsible for environmental
degradation is obliged to take appropriate remedial steps. These
obligations arise in different regulatory contexts under criminal
and administrative environmental legislation. For example, a
court convicting a person of certain offences in relation to sites of
special scientific interest may order the convicted person to carry
out works specified in the order for the purposes of restoring the
75. Local Government Act, 1972, c. 70, § 222 (Eng.).
76. Id.
77. City of London Corp. v. Bovis Constr. Ltd., (1988) 3 All E.R. 697 (Court of
Appeal) (Eng.).
78. Environment Act, 1995, c. 25, § 37(1)(a) (Gr. Brit.). It is understood that the
Environment Agency uses this power to seek an injunction only in exceptional
circumstances.
79. Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act, 2006, c. 16, § 13(1) (Eng.).
80. SIR WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 579 (9th
ed. 2004).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 579-80.
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site of special scientific interest to its former condition.8 3 A simi-
lar order to carry out remedial work can be made by a court con-
victing a person of offences relating to prescribed activities under
the Pollution Prevention and Control (England and Wales) Regu-
lations 2000.84
Other restoration obligations may be imposed by an adminis-
trative order of the regulatory authority, irrespective of criminal
proceedings and sometimes even though no criminal offence has
been committed. The contaminated land legislation has been dis-
cussed above. 85 Part IIA of the Environmental Protection Act
(EPA) imposes duties on local authorities to identify contaminated
land (as defined in the EPA) and then ensure that it is remediated
by the "appropriate person."86 Generally, if the appropriate per-
son does not agree to carry out the remediation voluntarily, the
local authority must serve a remediation notice requiring that
person to carry out the necessary work. 87
Other examples are to be found in the statutory nuisance and
water pollution legislation. Under the former, if a local authority
is satisfied that a statutory nuisance88 exists, or is likely to occur
or recur in its area, it must serve an abatement notice on the per-
son responsible 89 "requiring the abatement of the nuisance or
prohibiting or restricting its occurrence or recurrence" and/or re-
quiring the execution of works for any of those purposes. 90
Under the latter, if "poisonous, noxious or polluting matter or
any solid waste matter" enters or is at a place from which it is
likely to enter controlled waters, the Environment Agency may,
but is not obliged to, serve a works notice on the person who
caused or knowingly permitted the presence of that matter to un-
dertake appropriate remedial or preventive works.91
The European Union (EU) Directive on Environmental Liabil-
ity with regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmen-
83. Wildlife and Countryside Act, 1981, c. 69, § 31 (Gr. Brit.).
84. Pollution Prevention and Control (England and Wales) Regulations, 2000, S.I.
2000/1973, reg. 35.
85. See Circular Facilities, [2005] EWHC (Admin) 865; supra text accompanying
notes 15-41.
86. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 78E (Gr. Brit.); Circular Facili-
ties, [2005] EWHC (Admin) 865, 3.
87. See Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 78E (Gr. Brit.).
88. Id. § 79(1) (defining statutory nuisance).
89. Id. § 79(7) (defining person responsible), as amended by Noise and Statutory
Nuisance Act, 1993, c. 40, § 2(4).
90. Id. § 80(1).
91. Water Resources Act, 1991, c. 57, § 161A (U.K.)
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tal Damage92 takes a different approach. In the event of
"environmental damage"93 (or an imminent threat of such dam-
age) caused by any Annex III activity, 94 the operator is required to
take necessary remedial or preventive measures. 95 The point to
emphasise is that the obligations on the operator are self-execut-
ing.96 In other words, the operator is obliged to take action with-
out waiting for an administrative order from the regulatory
authority. That duty is reinforced by a duty on the regulator to
require the operator to do the work.97
F. Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs)
Under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998,98 any natural person
over the age of 10 can be made the subject of an ASBO by the
courts for anti-social behaviour which is defined as acting in a
manner that "causes or is likely to cause harassment, harm or dis-
tress to one or more persons not of the same household as the per-
92. Council Directive 2004/35, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56 (EU).
93. Environmental Damage is defined as:
(a) damage to protected species and natural habitats, which is any dam-
age that has significant adverse effects on reaching or maintaining the
favourable conservation status [defined in article 2, paragraph 4] of such
habitats or species... ;
(b) water damage, which is any damage that significantly adversely ef-
fects the ecological, chemical and/or quantitative status and/or ecological
potential, as defined in Directive 2000/60/EC, of the waters concerned
(c) land damage, which is any land contamination that creates a signifi-
cant risk of human health being adversely affected as a result of the di-
rect or indirect introduction, in, on or under land, of substances,
preparations, organisms or micro-organisms ....
Id., art. 2, at 59 (citing Council Directive 2000/60, 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1 (EU)). Pro-
tected species and habitats include species and natural habitats listed in annexes to
Council Directive 79/409, On the Conservation of Wild Birds, 1979 O.J. (L 103) 1 (EC),
or Council Directive 92/43, On the Conservation of Natural Habitats of Wild Fauna
and Flora, 1992 O.J. (L 206) 7 (EC), and any other habitat or species which member
states choose to designate for equivalent purposes as those specified in these two Di-
rectives, Council Directive 2004/35, supra note 92, art. 2, at 59.
94. Annex III of Council Directive 2004/35, supra note 92, at 70, contains a list of
activities governed by various EU Environmental Directives.
95. Id., arts. 5, 6, at 61-62. Article 7 and Annex II deal with the determination of
remedial measures, which include "complementary remediation" where the damaged
resources do not return to their baseline condition and "compensatory remediation" to
compensate for the interim loss of resources pending recovery. Id. at 62, 67.
96. Valerie Fogelman, Enforcing the Environmental Liability Directive: Duties,
Powers and Self-Executing Provisions, 4 ENVTL. LIABILITY 127 (2006).
97. Council Directive 2004/35, supra note 92, art. 5, 4, art. 6, 3, at 61-62.
98. Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, c. 37 (Eng.).
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son who is the subject of the complaint."99 Although mainly used
against anti-social youths, ASBOs are used to control low-level en-
vironmental degradation such as graffiti, fly-posting, burning rub-
bish, litter, noise, vehicles which are a nuisance, misuse of
fireworks and light pollution.100
V. ENFORCEMENT DUTIES AND POWERS
A duty to enforce the laws, rather than a mere power, is likely
to increase enforcement in practice. However, the effect may not
always be as marked as desired.
The majority of environmental regulatory regimes are
founded on a power to enforce, which is vested in the regulatory
authority. That involves discretion as to whether and how to
enforce in particular cases. Examples are the Works Notice proce-
dure in the water pollution legislation' 01 and waste manage-
ment 10 2 legislation. In addition to the Environment Agency's
power to serve a works notice, if the offending matter in question
has entered controlled waters, the Agency has discretion as to
whether to prosecute. 0 3 On the other hand, the contaminated
land and statutory nuisance regimes are mandatory in that when
prescribed circumstances exist, the regulatory authorities are
obliged to serve a notice requiring the recipient to take certain
steps. 10 4 Nevertheless, it is apparent that mandatory enforce-
ment duties do not result in efficient enforcement in practice if the
necessary conditions for liability are difficult to establish.
It has been explained above that difficulties in identifying the
appropriate person for the purpose of the contaminated land legis-
lation has slowed the implementation of that legislation to a con-
siderable extent. That effect has arisen despite the layers of
duties imposed on the enforcement authorities to ensure that con-
taminated sites are remediated. Those duties are successively to
inspect their areas from time to time to identify potentially con-
taminated land, to determine whether that particular land is in
fact contaminated, 0 5 to notify specified persons (including appro-
99. Id.
100. Michael Watson, Anti-Social Behaviour Orders and Environmental Protection
18 ENVTL. L. & MGMT. 47 (2006).
101. Water Resources Act, 1991, c. 57, §§ 161A-161D (U.K.).
102. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, §§ 29-78 (U.K.).
103. See Water Resources Act, 1991, c. 57, § 85 (U.K.).
104. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, §§ 78E, 80(1) (Gr. Brit.).
105. See Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 78B(1) (Eng.); DEPARTMENT
OF THE ENVIRONMENT, TRANSPORT, AND THE REGIONS, CIRCULAR 2/2000: CONTAMI-
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priate agencies owners and occupiers) of any determination
made, 0 6 and (subject to certain conditions) to serve a remediation
notice requiring the appropriate remedial work to be carried
out L0 7 . However, there is a mandatory three month delay period
between identification of the contaminated land and the service of
a remediation notice (except in the case of an imminent danger of
serious harm or serious pollution of controlled waters) to en-
courage the appropriate person to carry out the necessary work
voluntarily. 0 8
In the case of statutory nuisance legislation, 0 9 effective en-
forcement has been impeded by evidentiary difficulties in estab-
lishing the existence of a statutory nuisance as well as lack of
resources. Local authorities have a duty to inspect their areas
from time to time to detect any statutory nuisances and to take
reasonably practicable steps to investigate complaints of statutory
nuisances by persons living within their area." 0 As stated ear-
lier, where a local authority is satisfied of the existence of a statu-
tory nuisance, it has a duty to serve an abatement notice."'
However, traditionally, environmental health officers have often
preferred to act by persuasion rather than by formal legal steps,
largely for the reasons suggested above. This approach has been
sanctioned to a limited extent by a recent change in the law. The
environmental health officer can delay serving an abatement by
up to seven days to persuade the appropriate person to abate the
nuisance or prohibit or restrict its occurrence or recurrence. How-
ever, if persuasion does not achieve the desired objective within
that period, an abatement notice must then be served.1' 2
NATED LAND: IMPLEMENTATION OF PART IIA OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT
1990 (2000).
106. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 78B(3) (Eng.).
107. See id. § 78E.
108. See id. § 78H(3)(a)(ii), (4).
109. See id. §§ 79-84.
110. See id. § 79(1).
111. See id. § 80(1); see also supra text accompanying notes 64-66; R v. Carrick
Dist. Council, [1996] 160 J.P. 912 (Q.B.) (U.K.).
112. See id. § 80(2A)-(2E) (inserted by section 86 of the Clean Neighbourhoods and
Environment Act 2005, which came into force on 6 April 2006 in England (Clean
Neighbourhoods and Environment Act, 2005, c. 16, § 87, schedule 2 (Eng.))).
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VI. ENFORCEMENT BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
Any enforcement function on the part of the regulatory au-
thorities will be reinforced to the extent that enforcement action
may be taken by private persons in the absence of action by the
authorities. Under English law there are considerable possibili-
ties for private persons to take action against those who infringe
environmental law and against the authorities themselves if they
fail to observe their duties.
Under English law any person may prosecute a criminal of-
fence without having to establish an interest, unless there is a re-
striction in the relevant legislation 13. Under the older
environmental legislation, it was common to find provisions that
prosecutions could only be brought by the regulatory authority or
with the consent of the Attorney General' 14 or the Director of Pub-
lic Prosecutions. 115 Modern environmental legislation generally
contains no such restrictions, 116 so any person can prosecute
offences.
Exceptionally, there are procedures enabling aggrieved indi-
viduals to bring proceedings in the courts for an administrative
order, such as an abatement order to deal with statutory
nuisance.117
As explained earlier, any person can seek an injunction in ap-
propriate cases to prevent infringements of the law by means of a
relator action, provided that the Attorney General gives his
consent."18
Where a person complains that the regulatory authority is not
enforcing the law properly, a distinction must be drawn between
cases where the authority has the discretion to act and those
where it has a duty to act. In the former case, the courts will not
113. See Prosecution of Offences Act, 1985, c. 23, § 6 (Eng.). The Attorney-General
and the Director of Public Prosecutions can take over any private prosecution and
either continue or discontinue it. See id.
114. E.g. Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act, 1961, c. 50, § 11 (Eng.).
115. E.g. Health and Safety at Work Act etc., 1974, c. 37, § 38 (Eng.). This Act
governed proceedings for air pollution offences under the Alkali, etc, Works Regula-
tion Act 1906. See generally Alkali, etc. Works Regulation Act, 1906, c. 14, § 1-31
(Eng.).
116. E.g. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 33 (Eng.) (waste); Water Re-
courses Act, 1991, c. 57, § 85 (Eng.) (water pollution).
117. See Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 82 (Eng.). The procedure ex-
ists in parallel with the duty on local authorities to serve an abatement notice under
section 80. Id. § 80.
118. See supra text accompanying note 59.
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interfere with the exercise of discretion by the authority, provided
that it is reasonable. 119 For example, if the authority made a deci-
sion not to enforce the law, that would be an abuse of their discre-
tion. On the other hand, the authorities are bound to comply with
a duty to enforce the law.
The remedy available to individuals and NGO's to challenge
enforcement failures by the regulatory authorities is judicial re-
view. 120 An applicant for judicial review who has "a sufficient in-
terest in the subject matter to which the application relates"1 21
may challenge any illegality, irrationality or procedural impropri-
ety in any act, omission or decision of a public body in relation to
it.122
Particularly following the Inland Revenue Commissioners
case 123, the rules on standing have become very relaxed. In that
case, the House of Lords held that the question of sufficient inter-
est could not be considered in isolation, but rather, "the test is
whether the applicant can show a strong enough case on the mer-
its, judged in relation to his own concern with it. '124 It follows
that the House of Lords has practically abolished any requirement
of standing distinct from the merits of the case. According to
Wade & Forsyth, "[T]he real question [of standing] is whether the
applicant can show some substantial default or abuse, and not
whether his personal rights or interests are involved. In effect,
therefore, a citizen's action, or actio popularis, is in principle al-
lowable in suitable cases." 125 This goes beyond the requirements
of the Aarhus Convention, which is discussed later.
The relaxed approach to standing has benefited a number of
environmental organisations who have thereby been enabled to
bring proceedings for judicial review. For example, Greenpeace
had standing to challenge the grant of an authorisation for a nu-
119. R v. Comm'r of Police of the Metropolis, [19681 2 Q.B. 118, 125, 139. See also
WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 80, at 359-61.
120. See generally WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 80, at 559-740.
121. See Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 31(3) (Eng.); CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES,
1998, No. 3132 L. 17, sched. 1 (Eng.).
122. Council of Civil Serv. Unions v. Minister for Civil Serv., [1985] A.C. 374, 408
(H.L.) (U.K.) (Lord Diplock's statement on judicial review).
123. See generally R v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, [1981] A.C. 617 (H.L.) (U.K.).
124. WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 80, at 692 (discussing the liberalizing effect of
the Inland Revenue Commissioners case on standing).
125. Id. at 694.
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clear generator, 126 and Friends of the Earth was entitled to pro-
ceed against a government department, claiming that water
standards should be properly enforced. 127
The most notable departure from the modern trend on stand-
ing is the Rose Theatre case,1 28 in which the judge refused to allow
standing to a company established to preserve the archaeological
remains of the historic Rose Theatre in Southwark.129 The com-
pany sought to challenge the refusal of the Secretary of State to
list the remains as an ancient monument. 30 The judge's initial
analysis dealt not with whether the company had standing, but
whether the case had any merit.131 It was only after deciding the
case against the company that the judge held that the company
lacked standing. 32 This approach has not been followed in later
cases and may be regarded as an aberration. Wade and Forsyth
suggest that it is best regarded as a case in which an arguable
issue was not shown.133
Unsurprisingly these changes to the rules of standing for
prosecutions and judicial review have been accompanied by a mas-
sive increase in the number of environmental cases brought before
the courts.
VII. USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS TO ENFORCE
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
The European Convention on Human Rights, 3 4 which was
mainly drafted by UK lawyers, contains a number of different
rights. Some of these rights are absolute and permit no deroga-
tion. However, those which are most relevant to the environment
are qualified and allow derogations where necessary for the legiti-
mate benefit of others and the community as a whole. Those pro-
visions are Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life
and home) and Article 1 of the First Protocol (protection of prop-
126. R v. Inspectorate of Pollution, (1993) 4 All E.R. 329 (Q.B.D.) (Greenpeace was
involved ex parte, and sought judicial review of the decision to vary the existing
authorizations.).
127. R v. Sec'y of State for the Env't, (1994) 4-04-1994 The Times 1060, 510
(Q.B.D.) (Friends of the Earth was again involved ex parte.).
128. R v. Sec'y of State for the Env't, (1989) 1 Q.B. 504 (Rose Theatre Trust Co. was
involved ex parte.).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. WADE & FoRssvH, supra note 80, at 699.
134. Implemented in UK law by the Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.).
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erty).135 After holding earlier that the European Convention pro-
vided no right to environmental protection or quality, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has nonetheless
demonstrated that (particularly in serious cases) it can have a
powerful effect on human rights.
Lopez Ostra v. Spain concerned a plant for the treatment of
tannery wastes that had been constructed close to the applicant's
home. 136 Fumes, odours and contaminants released from the
plant led to nuisances and health problems in the locality.1 37 De-
spite a temporary evacuation of the area and closure of some
plant, environmental problems continued. 138
The ECHR found in favour of the applicant.139 The court held
that "severe environmental pollution might affect individuals'
well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a
way as to affect their private and family life adversely, without,
however, seriously endangering their health.' 140 Even though
there was no absolute obligation on the state to prevent such pol-
lution, it had to strike a balance between the economic benefits of
operating the plant and the environmental problems faced by the
applicant.' 4 ' In failing to take adequate steps to prevent those
problems, the correct balance had not been struck. 42
Another case, Guerra v Italy, concerned a factory that re-
leased considerable quantities of inflammable and toxic sub-
stances, which had endangered local residents on numerous
occasions. 143 One of the most serious occurrences was in 1976
when a factory malfunction led to the hospitalisation of 150 people
sick with arsenic poisoning. 144 The ECHR followed Lopez Ostra in
holding that the failure to reduce pollution risks and avoid major
accidents was a breach of Article 8.145 Article 8 was breached in
135. A substantial quantity of literature on this subject exists.. See, e.g.. Justine
Thornton & Stephen Tromans, Human Rights and Environmental Wrongs - Incorpo-
rating the European Convention on Human Rights: Some Thoughts on the Conse-
quences for UK Environmental Law, 11 J. ENVTL. L. 35 (1999); Mark Stallworthy,
Whither Environmental Human Rights?, 7 ENv. L. REV. 12 (2005).
136. Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 277 (1994).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Guerra v. Italy, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 357 (1998).
144. Id.
145. Id.
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this case, like in Lopez Ostra, because pollution had adversely af-
fected private and family life. 146
The recent case of Fadeyeva v. Russia concerned the privately
owned Severstal steel plant that had caused pollution over a long
period, leading to Ms. Fadeyeva's complaints of diminished
health.147 The court found in Ms. Fadeyeva's favour, holding that
the state should have protected her by rehousing her away from
the plant or ensuring that its pollution levels were appropriately
reduced. 148
The key features of these rulings are that in each case: (a) The
levels of pollution caused were high; and (b) The state failed to
enforce its own national legislation. That being so, Article 8 can
be viewed as an indirect enforcement mechanism in serious pollu-
tion cases, whereby the state is required to pay compensation to
the claimant for failing to enforce its own laws, even though under
those laws themselves there may be no duty of enforcement.
Despite these undoubted successes, however, environmental
human rights have fared less well in cases where the substantive
domestic environmental law has not proved responsive to the
needs of claimants. That tendency is particularly evident in the
decision of the Grand Chamber of the ECHR in the Hatton case. 149
VIII. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS: PRINCIPLE 10 AND
THE AARHUS CONVENTION
Of greater importance in encouraging enforcement of the law
and ensuring that the regulatory authorities carry out their duties
properly are procedural rights. Rights to information, participa-
tion, and access to justice are likely to improve the governmental
functions of protecting the environment and the interests of future
generations whilst satisfying present human needs. 150 Compre-
hensive rights of this type are mandated by Principle 10 of the Rio
Declaration of 1992 which states:
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of
all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national
level, each individual shall have appropriate access to informa-
146. Id.
147. Fadeyeva v. Russia, [2005] Eur. Ct. H.R. 376.
148. Id. at T 133.
149. Hatton v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 28 (2003) (holding that domestic
law gave plaintiff no remedy for airport noise pollution).
150. BIRNIE & BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2nd
ed 2002), pp 261 ff.
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tion concerning the environment that is held by public authori-
ties, including information on hazardous materials and
activities in their communities, and the opportunity to partici-
pate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and
encourage public awareness and participation by making infor-
mation widely available. Effective access to judicial and admin-
istrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be
provided." 151
Rights of these types have been incorporated in a number of
international and regional measures, such as the Biological Diver-
sity Convention of 1992152 and the original EC Directive on the
Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment. 15 3 How-
ever, the most noteworthy instrument for implementing Principle
10 is the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Par-
ticipation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environ-
mental Matters of 1998.154 Being a regional convention of the UN
Economic Commission for Europe, its geographical scope covers
most of the northern hemisphere. Significantly, the preamble of
this far-reaching treaty proclaims that, "every person has the
right to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and
well-being, and the duty, both individually and in association with
others, to protect and improve the environment for the benefit of
present and future generations." 155 The importance of this state-
ment lies in linking the procedural rights of humans to the duty to
protect the environment.
The preamble of the Convention considers further that in or-
der to "assert this right and observe this duty", in relation to envi-
ronmental matters citizens must have (1) access to information;
(2) an entitlement to participate in decision-making; and (3) ac-
cess to justice. 15 6 Each Party to the Convention is obliged to take
the necessary legislative, regulatory, and other measures, includ-
ing enforcement measures, to achieve a clear, transparent, and
151. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
Principle 10, U.N. Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992).
152. Convention on Biological Diversity art. 14, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (the
rights are given "where appropriate").
153. Council Directive 90/313/EEC, On the Freedom of Access to Information on
the Environment, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 56-58 (repealed).
154. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters done at Aarhus, Denmark, June 25,
1998, 38 I.L.M 517 [hereinafter Aarhus Convention].
155. Id. preamble.
156. Id.
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consistent framework to implement the Convention. 157 Signifi-
cantly, "appropriate recognition of and support to associations, or-
ganisations or groups promoting environmental protection" must
be provided and national legal systems must be consistent with
this obligation. 158
A. Access to Environmental Information
Article 4 provides a broad right for the public, 159 without hav-
ing to state an interest, to require public authorities to provide
environmental information1 60held by them.1 61 The definitions of
"public," "environmental information," and "public authority" are
wide.1 62 In particular the definition of "public authority" in the
Convention is wider than that under the earlier EC Directive on
Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment. 16 3 Unlike
that in the Directive, the definition in the Convention specifically
includes natural or legal persons providing public services in rela-
157. Id. art. 3.1.
158. Id. art. 3.4.
159. "The Public" refers to "one or more natural or legal persons, and, in accor-
dance with national legislation or practice, their associations, organizations or
groups." Id. art. 2.4.
160. "Environmental Information" means any information in written, visual, au-
ral, electronic or any other material form on: (a) The state of elements of the environ-
ment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape and natural sites,
biological diversity and its components, including genetically modified organisms, and
the interaction among these elements; (b) Factors, such as substances, energy, noise
and radiation, and activities or measures, including administrative measures, envi-
ronmental agreements, policies, legislation, plans and programmes, affecting or likely
to affect the elements of the environment within the scope of subparagraph (a) above,
and cost-benefit and other economic analyses and assumptions used in environmental
decision-making; (c) The state of human health and safety, conditions of human life,
cultural sites and built structures, inasmuch as they are or may be affected by the
state of the elements of the environment or, through these elements, by the factors,
activities or measures referred to in subparagraph (b) above. Id. art. 2.3.
161. According to Article 2.1, "public authority" means:
(a) Government at national, regional and other level; (b) Natural or legal
persons performing public administrative functions under national law,
including specific duties, activities or services in relation to the environ-
ment; (c) Any other natural or legal persons having public responsibilities
or functions, or providing public services, in relation to the environment,
under the control of a body or person falling within subparagraphs (a) or
(b) above; (d) The institutions of any regional economic integration organ-
ization referred to in article 17 which is a Party to this Convention. This
definition does not include bodies or institutions acting in a judicial or
legislative capacity.
162. See supra notes 159-161.
163. Compare note 161 with Council Directive 90/313/EEC, art. 2(b), 1990 O.J. (L
158) 56, 57.
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tion to the environment if they are controlled by a governmental
or administrative authority. 164 To illustrate the breadth of the
Convention's definition, this would include privatised sewerage
undertakers, even though their status under the earlier EC direc-
tive was questionable.
The Convention provides that a request for environmental in-
formation may be refused if the public authority does not hold it, if
the request is manifestly unreasonable or formulated too gener-
ally, or if it relates to material in the course of completion or to the
internal communications of public authorities. 165 There are also a
number of other exceptions.' 66
Environmental information must be provided or a refusal
given in writing "as soon as possible and at the latest within one
month" unless the complexity of the information justifies an ex-
tension up to two months after the request. 67
In addition to the duty to provide environmental on request,
Convention Parties must ensure that public authorities collect
and disseminate environmental information. 168
B. Public Participation
Article 6 provides a right for the public to participate in deci-
sions on whether to permit proposed activities listed in Annex I,
164. Id.
165. Aarhus Convention, supra note 154, art. 4.3. In the case of incomplete mate-
rial and the internal communications of public authorities, the public interest served
by disclosure must be taken into account. Id.
166. Under Article 4.4, requests for environmental information may also be re-
fused if disclosure would adversely affect any of the following interests: (a) "the confi-
dentiality of the proceedings of public authorities . . ."; (b) "international relations,
national defence or public security;" (c) the course of justice, a person's ability to re-
ceive a fair trial, or a public authority's ability to conduct a criminal or disciplinary
enquiry; (d) the confidentiality of commercial and industrial information, where pro-
tected by law "to protect a legitimate economic interest;" (e) intellectual property
rights; (f) the confidentiality of personal data or files relating to a natural person who
has not consented to disclosure; (g) the interests of a third party who has supplied the
information without being "under or capable of being put under a legal obligation to
do so," and who has not consented to its release; (h) the environment, such as "the
breeding sites of rare species." However, it is provided that these grounds of refusal
should be interpreted restrictively taking into account both the public interest served
by disclosure, and whether-the information relates to emissions to the environment.
Id.
167. Id. arts. 4.2, 4.7.
168. Id. art. 5.
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which are broadly those covered by the Environmental Impact As-
sessment Directive 169 and the IPPC Directive. 170
The public must be informed by public notice or individually,
as appropriate, early in the decision-making procedure of: (1) the
proposed activity and the application made; (2) full details of the
proposed procedure, including opportunities for the public to par-
ticipate; (3) the public authority making the decision; (4) the na-
ture of possible decisions or the draft decision; (5) an indication of
the relevant environmental information available; and (6) if the
activity is subject to an environmental impact assessment
procedure. 171
Convention Parties are required to provide for early public
participation, when all options are open and effective participa-
tion can take place,172 access to relevant information, 173 and an
opportunity for "the public to submit in writing or, as appropriate,
at a public hearing or inquiry," any comments, information, analy-
ses or opinions that it considers relevant to the proposed activ-
ity.1 74 The decision by the public authority must take due account
of the outcome of the public participation.1 75
Public participation procedures must also be in place when
permits are reconsidered or their conditions updated,1 76 as well as
in relation to the preparation of plans, programmes, and policies
relating to the environment1 77 and "executive regulations and
other generally applicable legally binding rules that may have a
significant effect on the environment."' 78
C. Access to Justice
Those whose requests for environmental information have not
been dealt with satisfactorily should be given "access to a review
procedure before a court of law or other independent and impar-
tial body established by law."179 Where review by a court of law is
169. Council Directive 85/337/EEC, art. 6, 1985 O.J. (L 175) 140, 142, amended by
Council Directive 97/11/EC, art. 1.8, 1997 O.J. (L 73) 5, 7.
170. Council Directive 96/61JEC, art. 15, 1996 O.J. (L 257) 26, 32.
171. Aarhus Convention, supra note 154, art. 6.2.
172. Id. art. 6.4.
173. Id. art. 6.6. This is without prejudice to Article 4. Id. art. 4.
174. Id. art. 6.7.
175. Id. art. 6.8.
176. Id. art. 6.10.
177. Id. art. 7.
178. Id. art. 7.
179. Id. art. 9.1
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provided, there should also be access to "an expeditious procedure
* . .that is free of charge or inexpensive for reconsideration by a
public authority or review by an independent and impartial body
other than a court of law."180 Final decisions by any such body are
to bind the public authority holding the information.18 1 Reasons
for a decision must be given in writing at least in cases of refusal
of access to information.18 2
Members of the public should also be given "access to a review
procedure before a court of law and/or another independent and
impartial body established by law, to challenge the substantive
and procedural legality of any decision, act or omission" which is
covered by the public participation requirements under Arti-
cle6.18 3 That applies where parties can demonstrate a sufficient
interest or impairment of a right (where required by national ad-
ministrative law).' 84 In addition, subject to meeting any criteria
laid down by national law, members of the public must be given
access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts
and omissions by private persons and public authorities which
contravene national environmental law.'8 5
The access to justice procedures referred to must provide ade-
quate and effective remedies, including injunctive relief as appro-
priate, and must be "fair, equitable, timely, and not prohibitively
expensive. " 1 6 Convention Parties must also consider establishing
"appropriate assistance mechanisms to remove or reduce financial
and other barriers to access to justice."' 8 7
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. art. 9.2. These requirements shall not exclude the possibility of a prelimi-
nary review procedure before an administrative authority or affect the requirement of
exhaustion of administrative review procedures prior to judicial review where there is
such a requirement under national law. Id.
184. The requirements of "sufficient interest" and "impairment of right" are to be
determined "in accordance with the requirements of national law and consistently
with the objective of giving the public concerned wide access to justice within the
scope of th[e] Convention." Any NGO which promotes environmental protection and
meets any requirements under national law is to be deemed to have such an interest
and to have rights capable of being impaired. Id.
185. Id. art. 9.3.
186. Id. art. 9.4 Also, decisions must be in writing, and decisions of courts, "and
wherever possible of other bodies," must be accessible to the public. Id.
187. Id. art. 9.5.
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D. Implementing the Aarhus Convention
The Aarhus Convention promises to be effective, at least in
the European Union. Its three pillars of access to environmental
information, public participation, and access to justice, are being
implemented via directives. 188 It has been ratified, approved or
accepted by the European Union and most of the Member States,
including the United Kingdom.18 9
Apart from the specific requirements of the Convention, there
has been a long tradition of public participation in environmental
matters in England and Wales. For example, applications for con-
sents to discharge effluent to controlled waters, authorisations for
"prescribed processes" and permits for installations subject to in-
tegrated pollution permitting and control have to be advertised in
the press and are subject to comments by members of the public
188. See Council Directive 2003/4/EC, On the Freedom of Access to Information on
the Environment, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56-58 (repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC,
1990 O.J. (L 158); Council Directive 2003/35/EC, Providing for Public Participation in
Respect of the Drawing up of Certain Plans and Programmes Relating to the Environ-
ment, 2003 O.J. (L 156) 17-24; Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, COM
(2003) 624 final (Oct. 10, 2003). The Directive on Freedom of Access to Information on
the Environment, supra, has been implemented in England, Wales, and Northern Ire-
land by the Environmental Information Regulations, 2004 S.I. 2004/3391. The Direc-
tive Providing for Public Participation, supra, has been transposed in the UK by a
number of regulations including the Pollution Prevention and Control (Public Partici-
pation) Regulations, 2005, S.I. 2005/1448 (Eng. & Wales). There is a draft Regulation
on Application of Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community Institutions and Bodies,
2006, 2003/0204 (COD), C6-0156/2006, PE-CONS 3614/06, which is awaiting adoption
following approval by the European Union Council and Parliament. There is also a
notable procedure for public participation and access to justice in Council Directive
2004135/CE, On Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedy-
ing of Environmental Damage, 2004, art. 12, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56-65.
189. The EU signed and approved the Convention on February 17, 2005. See The
EU and the Aarhus Convention, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/ndex.htm
(last visited Apr. 29, 2007). The following Member States, e.g., have ratified the Con-
vention: Austria (17/01/2005); Belgium (21/01/2003); Cyprus (19/09/2003); Czech Re-
public (06/07/2004); Hungary (03/07/2001); Italy (13/06/2001); Latvia (14/06/2002;
Lithuania (28/01/2002); Malta (23/04/2002); Poland (15/02/2002); Portugal (09/06/
2003); Slovenia (29/07/2004); Spain (29/12/2004); UK (23/02/2005). The following
Member States, e.g., have approved the Convention: Denmark (29/09/2000); France
(08/07/2002). The following Member States, e.g., have accepted the Convention: Fin-
land (01/09/2004); Netherlands (29/12/2004). United Nations Treaty Collection, Con-
vention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access
to Justice in Environmental Matters, Participants, http://www.unece.org/env/pp/
ctreaty.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2007).
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which must be considered by the regulatory authority before it
makes its decision. 190
The Public Participation Directive amends the Environmen-
tal Assessment and IPPC Directives to require the public to be
given early and effective opportunities to participate in environ-
mental decision-making and permitting procedures. 19 1
The proposed Directive on Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters goes further than the Convention in at least one impor-
tant respect in that it provides for legal standing of "qualified enti-
ties."192 Qualified entities are to have "access to environmental
proceedings, including interim relief, without having a sufficient
interest or maintaining the impairment of a right," if the matter of
review falls within the ambit of their "statutory activities" and
their geographical area of activity.' 93 Specific criteria as well as a
requirement for a procedure for recognition of qualified entities
are prescribed by the proposed Directive.' 94
However, the proposed directive has now been sidelined by
the Council of Ministers. In response to a Parliamentary Ques-
tion, the Council stated in October 2005:
On 24 June 2005 the Council (Environment) was informed
about the state of play of discussions on the above-mentioned
Commission proposal. At this stage, a majority of delegations is
questioning the usefulness of this directive. They consider that the
Aarhus Convention, which has been ratified by most Member
States, implies sufficient legal requirements in terms of access to
justice and do not believe that the proposed harmonisation would
lead to a better application and enforcement of environmental leg-
islation. As long as these doubts persist, it is difficult to imagine
an adoption in the immediate future.' 95
The liberal rules on standing for judicial review in England
and Wales which have been discussed above should be sufficient
190. See Water Resources Act, 1991, c. 57, sched. 10, fl l(1)(b), 2(5) (U.K.); Envi-
ronmental Protection Act, 1990, sched. 1, 1(2) and 2(5) (U.K.); Pollution Prevention
and Control Regulations, 2000, S.I. 2000/1973, sched. 4, $1 5, 6, 12 (Eng. & Wales).
191. See Council Directive 2003/35/EC, supra note 188, arts. 3.4, 4.3.
192. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, supra note 188, art. 5.
193. Id.
194. See id. arts. 8, 9.
195. See Interinstitutional File 2003/0246 (COD) 9967/05 (reported that "[sleveral
delegations and the Commission have stated that the directive would still have an
added valuse since: not all Member States have ratified the Aarhus Convention yet;
[and] the directive would allow for a better enforcement of Community environmental
legislation in a manner that is not already ensured by the Aarhus Convention").
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to satisfy the requirements of the Aarhus Convention. However,
it will be recalled that the Convention also requires that court pro-
cedures must not be "prohibitively expensive." 196 There has been
considerable doubt as to whether that requirement would be met,
particularly in view of the long tradition that the losing party pays
the winner's costs in litigation, even though as a general rule the
issue of costs lies within the discretion of the court.
A recent decision of the Court of Appeal goes some way to-
wards meeting that objection, although the case did not relate to
an environmental issue and covers judicial applications generally.
The court held that a protective costs order (PCO), which extin-
guishes or limits the liability of the losing party to pay the win-
ner's costs, may be made at any time in the proceedings, although
normally an application would be made at the time of the initial
claim. 197 Nonetheless, it is questionable whether this decision
fully meets the requirements of the Convention, particularly in
those cases which are not purely of public interest.
IX. THE ROLE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL ACTORS
The crucial role of the environmental actors (legislators,
judges, regulatory authorities, regulated industry, lawyers and lit-
igants) in the functioning of environmental law and particularly
compliance and enforcement has been noted elsewhere.1 98 There
may be internal stimuli to act, such as commitment, training, ex-
perience and resources (judges, lawyers and regulatory authori-
ties), corporate social responsibility policies/environmental
management systems (regulated industry) and knowledge, con-
cern, determination,199 and access to resources (litigants).
196. Aarhus Convention, supra note 154, art. 9.4.
197. R (on the application of Corner House Research) v. Sec'y of State for Trade &
Indus., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 192, [20051 1 W.L.R. 2600 (Court of Appeal) (A PCO would
be made on the basis of five principles: (1) the case raises issues of general public
importance; (2) those issues should be resolved in the public interest; (3) the applicant
has no private interest in the matter; (4) it is fair and just to make the order consider-
ing the financial resources of the parties and the amount of costs likely to be at stake;
(5) in the absence of a PCO, the applicant is likely to discontinue proceedings).
198. Waite, supra note 1, at 36-37, 61-62.
199. In the area of common law, I have discussed elsewhere the determination of a
dying litigant seeking redress for the negligence of his various former employers as a
result of which he contracted mesothelioma through- working with asbestos. Id. at 44-
48. His efforts led to a change in the rules on causation as a result of which people in
his position who had previously been unable to claim compensation will be able to do
so in the future. Id.
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On the other hand there are many external stimuli such as
pressure from the public and NGOs on industry, commercial pres-
sure on companies from their customers, both corporate and indi-
vidual, and orders by regulatory authorities or the courts (or the
threat of such action). In the latter case, legal action or the threat
of action will only be a real stimulus if it is likely to be enforced.
As argued above, the actual practice of environmental law by
the "actors" may also lead to a refinement of the rules of substan-
tive environmental law and the procedural enforcement rules.200
However, the policies and principles of environmental law as
well as the quality of the substantive and procedural law also af-
fect the behaviour of the environmental actors and hence the
levels of compliance with and enforcement of the law. Taking the
onion analogy a little further, rottenness in any of the inner rings
of the onion affects the whole onion. Conversely, if all the onion
rings are sound, it is a wholesome and nutritious vegetable.
200. See id. at 44-48, 54-55.
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